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 Legal Issues Concerning the EU Unilateral Aviation ETS: A Chinese Perspective 
Wenqiong Liang* & Liying Zhang** 
 
ABSTRACT: Since January 2012, carbon emissions from international aviation have been 
formally included in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).  Airlines from 
outside the EU have struggled to find an escape from this arguably unfair decision.  China, the 
United States, Russia, India, and representatives from nineteen other countries signed the 
Moscow Joint Declaration in February of 2012 to demonstrate opposition to the EU’s 
unilaterally enacted aviation carbon tax.  Originally, the EU had no intention of canceling or 
suspending its plan to tax the aviation industry’s carbon emissions; however, after international 
pressure from a number of opposing countries and airlines, the EU decided to suspend the 
implementation of the aviation portion of the ETS.  This article will discuss the legal issues 
surrounding the EU  ETS and its potential impact on China's aviation industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 International air transportation emissions from all flights taking off and landing in the 
European Union (EU) were to be included in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
Directive1 beginning on January 1, 2012.2  Based on a 2010 International Transport Forum 
report, carbon dioxide emissions from aviation inside the EU have grown much more than in 
other sectors of transportation, increasing by 85% from 1990 to 2004. 3   The problem of 
greenhouse gasses from aviation should be solved inside the EU countries;4 however, many other 
countries have been influenced by the EU’s Directive.  For example, China’s airlines Air China, 
China Eastern Airlines, and China Southern Airlines are among the thirty-three airlines that the 
EU levied its carbon tax on.5    
Implementation of the EU ETS is expected to increase operating costs of the 
aforementioned airlines6 by increasing costs associated with purchasing emission allowances, 
calculating historical annual emissions, establishing statistical systems, and creating and 
maintaining regulatory bodies.  According to estimates from the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), the EU ETS could impose increased costs of billions of dollars on the 
                                                             
1 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 Nov. 2008 Amending Directive 
2003/101/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading 
Within Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 [hereinafter Directive 2008/101/EC]. 
2
 JANE A. LEGGETT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42392, AVIATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSION 
TRADING SCHEME 3 (2012).  
3
 The Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Reducing Transport Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Trends & 
Data 12–13 (2010). 
4
 Annela Anger & Jonathan Köhlerb, Including Aviation Emissions in the EU ETS: Much Ado About Nothing? A 
Review, 17 TRANSP. POL’Y 38, 39–40 (2010). 
5
 See, e.g., Michael Martina, EU Parries China's Jab on Aviation Emissions Scheme, REUTERS, July 6, 2011, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/uk-china-eu-aviation-idUSLNE76502Z20110706 (“At least 
16 Chinese airlines have the right to fly to Europe, with 11 operating regular services.  Among the most affected will 
be Air China Ltd . . . , China Southern Airlines Co Ltd . . . and China Eastern Airlines Corp Ltd . . . .”). 
6
 See, e.g., Hua Lan, Comments on EU Aviation ETS Directive and EU - China Aviation Emission Dispute, 45 
REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 589, 595, 600 (2011) (stating that the EU ETS “would dramatically increase the 
[Chinese] airlines’ operations costs and hinder further development of China’s burgeoning aviation industry.”). 
 international aviation industry as a whole.7  According to the Civil Aviation Administration of 
China (CAAC), the EU’s carbon tax will impose an additional 8 million Chinese Yuan (CNY) 
(equivalent to over 1.2 million U.S. dollars (USD)) on China’s airlines in 2012, 3 billion CNY 
per year by 2020, and 17.6 billion CNY in cumulative spending by 2020.8  Air China is expected 
to emit 740,000 more tons of carbon dioxide than they were allotted in 2012, which would be 
subject to taxation.9  According to the European Climate Exchange, allowances per ton of carbon 
dioxide were traded at 9.93 Euro (EUR) (equivalent to almost 11.5 USD) in 2012, and therefore 
Air China would pay 7.38 million EUR in EU carbon taxes that same year (equivalent to 64.76 
million CNY).10   On February 6, 2012, the CAAC, without approval from the appropriate 
government departments, formally prohibited Chinese airlines from participating in the EU ETS, 
denouncing the carbon tax as a guise to raise taxes and fees.11  Consequently, only governments 
can solve the controversy brought about by imposing carbon taxes on international aviation. 
A significant amount of controversy has arisen regarding whether the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) has the authority to control carbon emissions produced from 
international aviation.  For example, in Air Trans. Assoc. of America v. Sec. of State for Energy 
and Climate Change,12 the claimants argued that “the European Union is exceeding its powers 
under international law by not confining its emissions trading scheme to wholly intra-European 
                                                             
7
 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, FINANCIAL IMPACT OF EXTENDING THE EU ETS TO AIRLINES 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.endseurope.com/docs/70606b.pdf (“We estimate that this additional cost will average €3.48-7.47 per 
passenger on intra-EU markets and €18.77-40.12 per passenger on extra-EU markets.”). 
8
 See, e.g., Robbery in the Skies: Chinese Airlines to Pay EU 8 Million Yuan per Year in Carbon Tax, CHINA ECON. 
WEEKLY (May 17, 2011), http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/05-17/3044986.shtml. 
9
 Zhikun Li & Xuezhu Wang, Analysis of Impact to Aviation Industry from 29 Countries to Moscow Declaration 
Proposal, CIVIL AVIATION RES. NET OF CHINA (Feb. 23, 2012), http://news.carnoc.com/list/214/214795.html. 
10
 Id.  
11
 See China Refuses to Pay the “Green Charge”, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2012-02/10/c_131402943.htm. 
12 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 4905 (2011).  
 flights and by including within it those sections of international flights that take place over the 
high seas or over the territory of third countries.”13  The claimants also argued that the “[ETS] 
for international aviation . . . should be negotiated and adopted under the [framework] of the 
ICAO.”14  Cooperation between the EU and the ICAO may lead to opportunities that enable the 
ICAO General Assembly to make effective decisions, thereby encouraging the international 
community to find a better way to solve the growing problem of carbon emissions.15  Without 
going through the ICAO, the EU unilaterally incorporated international aviation in its ETS, 
including all flights departing and arriving in airports within its territory.16  Several affected 
parties immediately challenged whether this move violated the rules of international law.17   
In addition to the challenge posed by the Air Transport Association of America (ATAA), 
many countries also demonstrated political and diplomatic opposition.18  On November 2, 2011, 
the ICAO urged the EU and its member countries to cooperate with the international community, 
explicitly voicing opposition to the EU’s unilateral scheme for the first time.19  In February 2012, 
twenty-three countries, including the United States, China, Brazil, and India, sent delegates to 
participate in an anti-carbon tax meeting in Moscow.  There, they executed and adopted the 
"Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting" (Moscow Declaration) and objected to the inclusion 
                                                             
13
 Id. at ¶ 42. 
14
 Id.  
15
 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Stopping the Clock of ETS and Aviation Emissions Following Last Week's 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council (Nov. 12, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-12-854_en.htm (“‘Stopping the clock’ creates space for the political negotiations and demonstrates 
confidence on the side of the EU that together with international partners we will succeed in ICAO to agree on 
meaningful international action.”). 
16
 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and Its Impact 2, ICAO Doc. C-WP/13790 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.greenaironline.com/photos/ICAO_C.194.WP.13790.EN.pdf (“The inclusion of international civil 
aviation in the EU ETS is a unilateral measure and in contravention to the articles of the Chicago Convention and its 
Preamble . . . .”). 
17
 See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS at ¶ 3. 
18
 See discussion infra Part 5.1. 
19
 See ICAO, supra note 16, at 5–6 (“Representatives of [the signing countries] . . . [o]ppose the EU’s plan to 
include all flights by non-EU carriers . . . which is inconsistent with applicable international law.”).  
 of aviation emissions in the EU ETS. 20   The Moscow Declaration set forth nine measures 
detailing how countries could demonstrate their opposition.21  According to the EU ETS, airlines 
would not make their first tax payment to the EU until April 2013.22  However, on November 12, 
2012, thanks to the efforts of the protesting countries, Connie Hedegaard, EU Commissioner for 
Climate Action, recommended the following to the twenty-eight EU member states: “The EU 
‘stops the clock’ when it comes to enforcement of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS to and 
from non-European countries until after the ICAO General Assembly next autumn.”23  In other 
words, the EU agreed to suspend imposing carbon emission taxes on flights of non-EU airlines in 
and out of the EU, while continuing to impose the tax on flights within the EU airspace.24  
However, the European Commission has already enacted the aviation carbon tax;25 therefore, the 
aviation carbon tax has only been suspended, not canceled.  
2 THE EU ETS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 CARBON EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
FRAMEWORK  
The EU ETS is based on a carbon ETS mechanism found in the Kyoto Protocol 
framework.26  On November 19, 2008, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU 
proposed Directive 2008/101/EC.27  This directive, which inducted the international aviation 
industry into the EU ETS system, became effective on February 2, 2009, and was formally 
                                                             
20
 Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting on Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the EU-ETS, Feb. 22, 
2012, available at http://www.greenaironline.com/photos/Moscow_Declaration.pdf [hereinafter Moscow 
Declaration]. 
21
 Measures included “[s]uspending current and future discussions and/or negotiations to enhance operating rights 
for EU airlines/aircraft operators” and “[i]mposing additional levies/charges on EU carriers/aircraft operators.”  Id. 
22
  See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 12. 
23
 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 15. 
24
 See id. 
25
 See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 14. 
26
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 17, Dec. 11 1997, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].  
27
 Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 3. 
 implemented on January 1, 2012. 28   Through this Directive, the EU unilaterally included 
international air transport into its ETS without the approval of the ICAO,29 demanding that the 
carbon emissions of all flights taking off and landing in airports within EU territory must comply 
with relevant legislation.  As one might imagine, this decision was challenged by many of the 
affected parties. 
2.2 THE EU DIRECTIVE INCORPORATED THE AVIATION INDUSTRY INTO THE 
EU ETS  
One of the EU’s purposes for including aviation emissions trading into the EU ETS was 
to legitimize the practice of forcing a carbon emissions tax on the aviation industry.  
Nevertheless, the goal of  eliminating greenhouse gas is implausible.  Emissions trading is one of 
the three emissions reduction mechanisms used in the Kyoto Protocol.30  The other two are the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 31  and Joint Implementation (JI). 32   These three 
mechanisms are applied to various emissions reduction projects, but the EU ETS is the first large 
international carbon ETS. 33   The EU initiated the ETS in 2005 to address global climate 
change.34  The implementation of Directive 2008/101/EC will require aircraft arriving in or 
leaving the EU to pay for carbon emissions for its full range of flight (in excess of the allowances 
                                                             
28
 See id. at 16–17. 
29
 See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, 2011 ECJ EUR-
Lex LEXIS 4905, ¶ 64 (2011). 
30
 The Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Dec. 8, 2014). 
31
 See id.. 
32
 See id.. 
33
 See A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, 
Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66, 66 (2007). 
34 See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 Establishing a 
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Commuinity and Amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC, (2003) O.J. (L 275) 32. 
 according to the relevant quota standard of the trading system).35  
2.3 THE EU’S PURPOSE FOR INCLUSION OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY IN ITS 
ETS  
Some scholars saw the EU ETS as creating both economic and environmental policy; for 
example, P.h.D. candidate Michael Buenger asked whether the EU’s policy should be considered 
to be “[g]reening the [p]lanet, [g]reen [p]rotectionism or [b]oth?”36  He asserted that the EU 
aimed to “use its vast regulatory power . . . to drive its economies to progressively incorporate 
environmental concerns as root considerations in commercial policies.”37  Buenger also asserted 
that the EU is attempting to protect its domestic economic interests, which could lead to 
establishing its dominance in the international aviation market.38   
First, in accordance with the provisions of Directive 2008/101/EC regarding allowance 
allocation, various airlines of the EU member countries will receive a higher number of 
allowances due to their considerably larger historical emissions.39  This is because most EU 
countries fit within the Directive’s “Grandfather Clause.”40  According to some estimates, fees 
imposed on non-EU airlines will substantially exceed those of the airlines of EU member 
                                                             
35
 See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 4. 
36
 Michael L. Buenger, The EU's ETS and Global Aviation: Why "Local Rules" Still Matter and May Matter Even 
More in the Future, 41 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 421, 428 (2013). 
37
 Id. at 431. 
38 Id. at 462–63 (“The Aviation Directive seeks to achieve the dual goals of attacking climate change and protecting 
domestic economic interests by incentivizing alternative behavior making existing behavior more expensive to 
continue while capitalizing on the effort.  If airlines must buy carbon credits and the cost of carbon increases, 
passengers are more likely to demand greater efficiency and innovation in the delivery of aviation services if for no 
other reason than to reduce associated expenses.  And, if the EU is ahead of the pack in altering its behavior and 
transforming its economy, better for its citizens and its future economic prospects.”). 
39 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2007- Mitigation of Climate Change 
(Working Group III Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change), at 758 (2007).  
40 See Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY 
 ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 293, 308 (2012) 
 countries.41  Secondly, the EU is hoping to assume a favorable position in the allocation of 
carbon emission allowances.  The European Commission monitors allowance allocation42 and 
distributes such allowances based on historical ton-kilometer data.43  Consequently, the EU is 
both the referee and the athlete; in other words, the fair and equitable implementation of 
Directive 2008/101/EC is questionable.  The deeper purpose behind the EU’s decision is its 
desire to have a louder voice in negotiations on international policy, market mechanisms, and 
strategies to combat climate change.44  Indeed, Buenger argues that the “ETS is evidence of the 
EU's effort to link environment well-being to the Common Market’s economic interests.”45    
3 THE QUOTA STANDARD OF THE EU ETS AND ITS IRRATIONALITY  
3.1 THE QUOTA STANDARD OF THE EU ETS  
The EU ETS is the largest market of carbon in the world.46  From 2005 to 2009, the 
volume of traded carbon increased from 322 million tons to 6,326 million tons, and its value 
                                                             
41
 Press Release, Latin Am. & Caribbean Air Transp. Ass’n, ALTA, the Latin America and Caribbean Air Transport 
Association Urges Latin American Governments to Strongly Reject Unilateral EU Emissions Trading Scheme (June 
6, 2011), available at http://www.alta.aero/2010/sites/default/files/ALTA%20EU-ETS%20060711%20English.pdf 
(“The EU-ETS favors European airlines over non-EU airlines, which will have to pay for a greater proportion of 
their credits, and favors non-European airlines operating a hub adjacent to the territory of the EU, as credits are only 
required for the leg of the flight that enters or leaves the EU. The airlines that will be most adversely affected are 
those that are situated furthest from Europe, without a nearby hub.”); but cf. Martin Schaefer et al., The Economic 
Impact of the Upcoming EU Emissions Trading System on Airlines and EU Member States—an Empirical 
Estimation, 2 EUR. TRANSP. RES. REV. 189, 189 (2010) (“European network carriers will be affected by a 
competitive disadvantage compared to non-EU airlines.”). 
42
 See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 19. 
43
 See id. at 8.  
44
 See ECOLOGIC INST., INST. FOR EUR. ENVTL. POL’Y, & CENT. EUR. U., FINAL REPORT FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 
THE 6TH ENVIRONMENT ACTION PROGRAMME 119 (2011) (“In relation to international environmental governance, it 
should be noted that the EU emerged as a global ‘green leader’ in the second half of the 1980s. Observers have 
identified, among other factors, the withdrawal of the U.S. as a leader in international environmental policy making, 
the EU's (competitive) interest in promoting its own rather stringent environmental standards at the international 
level, and the EU's desire to shape its identity as a civilian world power as possible reasons for the active role of the 
EU in international environmental policy making.”) (internal citations omitted). 
45 
Buenger, supra note 36, at 432. 
46
 See Zhen-Hua Feng, et al., Estimating Risk for the Carbon Market Via Extreme Value Theory: An Empirical 
Analysis of the EU ETS, 99 APPLIED ENERGY 97, 98 (2012). 
 grew from 8.2 billion USD to 1,184.74 billion USD.47  Each unit of emission quota represents a 
great value, therefore the allocated quota is particularly important.  While the EU officially 
began to impose the aviation carbon emissions tax on January 1, 2012, the Union Registry 
system was not adopted until May 2, 2013.48  Airlines may now register and open an account in 
the EU to obtain emissions allowances free of charge by their administering member state.49  In 
2012, the EU was expected to allocate 181 million emissions allowances to airlines.50  
The EU ETS originally had three stages of implementation: the first trading period 
between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2007; the second trading period between January 1, 
2008, and December 31, 2008; and the third trading period between January 1, 2013, and 
December 31, 2020.51  According to the provisions of Article 3a, Chapter II, of the Directive,52 
the aviation industry was included in the EU ETS as of January 1, 2012.  However, the year 
stipulated in the Directive is the last year of the second trading period of the EU ETS.  Therefore, 
the period from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2012, is actually the first stage of the aviation 
emissions trading system, and in the following eight years (from January 1, 2013, to December 
31, 2020), the aviation industry will begin the third stage of the aviation ETS within the EU ETS.  
According to the Directive, the EU's total annual allowances for the aviation industry can 
be divided into two parts: free allowances, allocated to the aircraft operators of the member 
                                                             
47
 Id. 
48
 Richard T. Ainsworth, Phishing & VAT Fraud in CO2 Permits: DICE in the EU-ETS Now, DICE in Power 
Tomorrow 4 (Boston University School of Law, Working Paper No. 14-74, 2014). 
49
 Oliver Heaton, Carbon Markets Update, GREEN AVIATION (June 29, 2014, 5:58 AM), 
http://greenaviation.org/news. 
50
 Xue Yanping, The Fallout of EU Aviation Carbon Emission Quotas, CHINA TODAY, 
http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/2011-10/28/content_401393.htm (last visited Jan 9, 2015). 
51
 EUR. COMM’N, THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM (EU ETS) 4 (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf.  
52
 Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 8, 17.  
 countries, and auction allowances.53  The total number of EU allowances allocated to the aviation 
industry in 2012 represents 97% of their “historical aviation emissions,” or the average of the 
annual emissions from international aircraft operating within EU territory between 2004 and 
2006.54  Fifteen percent of the total allowances were to be reserved for auction;55 therefore, the 
proportion of the free allowances received by aircraft operators in 2012 should be 85% of the 
total number available.56  
In the third trading period, the total number of allowances will be reduced to 95% of their 
historical aviation emissions.57  This period still has an auction quota of 15%; however, this 
percentage could increase along with the upward shift in the overall environmental objectives of 
the EU as a whole.58  In addition, during this stage 3% of the total allowances will “be set aside 
in a special reserve for aircraft operators” who have initiated EU-bound flights for the first time 
after 2012, or to those aircraft operators whose average annual growth rate of ton-kilometer data 
exceeded 18% from 2010 to 2014. 59   Therefore, within the third trading period, the free 
allowances received by aircraft operators will be 82% of the total amount available.60  
The European Commission and its member countries determine the allocation of free 
annual allowances to aircraft operators.61  Specifically, this is done in accordance with the test 
                                                             
53
 See id. at 6.  
54
 Id. at 8.  
55
 Id.  
56
 See Ling-Yun He & Yi-Xuan Gao, Including Aviation in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: 
Impacts on Industries, Macro-economy and Emissions in China, 4 INT'L J. ECON. & FIN. 91 (2012) (“85% of these 
allowances are granted for free [in the first trading period].”). 
57
 Id.  “For the period referred to in Article 11(2) beginning on 1 January 2013 . . . the total quantity of allowances to 
be allocated to aircraft operators shall be equivalent to 95% of the historical aviation emissions multiplied by the 
number of years in the period.”  Id. 
58
 Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 10. 
59
 Id. at 8. 
60
 Id. at 8, 10. 
61
 See Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of EU ETS Emissions, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring/index_en.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2014). 
 reports on the historical ton-kilometer data, as submitted by the aircraft operators in those 
countries.62  Aircraft operators of the countries pay for carbon emission rights in excess of the 
free quota portion in accordance with the emission test reports annually issued by the EU.63  As 
stated above, the EU is both the referee and the athlete under that system; therefore, the fairness 
of the arrangement is questionable at best.  
3.2 EXEMPTION ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR PURPOSE  
In accordance with the provisions of the Directive, “[w]here a third country adopts 
measures for reducing the climate change impact of flights departing from that country which 
land in the [European] Community, the Commission . . . shall consider options available in order 
to provide for optimal interaction between the [ETS] and that country’s measures.”64  In other 
words, countries that have adopted “equivalent measures” to control carbon emissions may 
receive tax exemptions.
65
  For example, if third countries use energy efficient and 
environmentally friendly products, they can obtain tax-free status.
66
  By offering this alternative, 
EU countries could receive an additional benefit reflective of another economic and strategic 
intention of the Directive: the hope that airlines around the world will use energy-efficient 
products.  This notion may also stimulate the export of the EU’s most advanced equipment, 
featuring low-carbon and energy-saving characteristics. 
 
                                                             
62
 See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9.  
63
 See id. at 16. 
64
 Id. at 14. 
65
 See id. at 5 (“The Community and its Member States should . . . encourage third countries to take equivalent 
measures.  If a third country adopts measures, which have an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of this 
Directive, to reduce the climate impact of flights to the Community, the Commission should consider the options 
available in order to provide for optimal interaction between the Community scheme and that country’s 
measures . . . .”).  
66
 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Revision of Energy Taxation Directive – Questions and Answers (Apr. 13, 
2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-238_en.htm?locale=en. 
 3.3 IRRATIONALITY IN DETERMINING THE BASE PERIOD  
The allowances of the EU ETS are granted by means of the baseline allocation method.
67
  
For example, at the outset of the third trading period, the average international aircraft emissions 
of EU countries from 2004 to 2006 is used as the base, a 5% reduction is set against that base as 
the emissions reduction target, and then a portion of the remaining 95% is allocated to the 
aircraft operators of various countries.
68
  The allowances are initially made according to the 2010 
ton-kilometers data test reports submitted by aircraft operators and are then allocated to aircraft 
operators based on the ton-kilometers emission ratio.
69
  
This allocation method allows the aircraft operators that have generated greater historical 
emissions on EU routes to receive more free emission allowances during the base period.  This 
undoubtedly provides an advantage to major EU aircraft operators.
70
  The EU ETS base period 
for China begins at the initial stage of China's civil aviation industry, which is marked by low 
historical emissions.
71
  Therefore, China's civil aviation industry is unlikely to obtain many free 
allowances.
72
  Additionally, because Chinese airlines use relatively new aircraft with high 
passenger capacities,
73
 there will be more overall routes and flights over the next few years.
74
  
                                                             
67
 See Guidance on Allocation Methodologies, at 7–8 (Apr. 14, 2011), available at 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/docs/gd2_allocation_methodologies_en.pdf.  
68
 Id. at 45. 
69
 See He & Gao, supra note 56, at 91.  
70
 See He Wang & Jia Yuan Kun, The EU Carbon Tax Disproportionately Impacts International Airlines, CARNOC 
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2011), http://cdn.carnoc.com/list/187/187285.html. 
71
 See Xiaoqin Zhu & Jun Wang, An Analysis of EU ETS and China’s Countermeasures, 14:5 J. JIANGSU U. 13, 15 
(2012). 
72 See, e.g., Melanie Hart, Europe Moves to Limit Aviation Emissions, China Follows, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2011/08/01/10195/europe-moves-to-limit-
aviation-emissions-china-follows/ (Identifying China’s argument “that any attempt to hold Chinese airlines to the 
same emission standards as developed countries would violate the UNFCCC guiding principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities.’”).  
73
 See China’s Aviation Industry Only Receives 3% of the Carbon Tax Exemptions, 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD 
(Dec. 27, 2011), http://finance.jrj.com.cn/industry/2011/12/27020911917351.shtml. 
74
 See, e.g., INT’L TRANSP. FORUM, STATISTICS BRIEF: TRENDS IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 2 (Dec. 2013), available 
at http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/statistics/StatBrief/2013-12-Trends-Perspective.pdf (“The biggest 
 Therefore, allocations obtained according to base period data will likely be insufficient to meet 
China’s developing needs.  Data from 2010 reveals that Chinese airlines only receive about 3% 
of the available allowances, whereas several major EU airlines obtain as much as 10%.
75
  This 
illustrates the imbalance inherent in the initial allocations.   
Because Chinese airlines use relatively new aircraft, their per capita emission levels are 
below average.
76
  It therefore follows that Chinese airlines should have fewer tax burdens due to 
their lower carbon emissions.  However, according to the EU's current allowance allocation 
criteria, Chinese airlines must pay a hefty amount in order to purchase emission allowances,
77
 
which directly weakens China’s competitiveness in the market.78  In accordance with the current 
Directive, China's civil aviation industry will have to continue its high-speed development with 
fewer allocations, fighting to compete with the EU aviation industry while paying higher costs in 
carbon emissions control.
79
 
3.4 THE UNREASONABLE NATURE OF THE CARBON PENALTY AND ITS DEEPER 
PURPOSE  
 
According to the operational procedures of the Directive, “carbon emission taxes are only 
calculated from the last stop before landing in Europe.”80  This results in a tendency to punish 
long haul direct flights.  Airlines may transfer or increase stopover points, select an airport closer 
to Europe as a stopover point, or adjust the flight schedule to avoid recording higher carbon 
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 emissions.
81
  This arrangement will in fact lead to increased carbon emissions.
82
  The true 
purpose of such arrangements is to weaken the competitiveness of the air transport industry of 
other countries,
83
 because passengers would normally choose EU airlines for the last leg of their 
trip into the EU.
84
  Furthermore, such arrangements that increase carbon emissions are contrary 
to the emissions reduction objectives of the Kyoto Protocol.
85
  
 
According to the quota allocation method provided for in the Directive, airlines will 
receive a proportion of free allowances that correspond to their reported ton-kilometer data in 
respect to the benchmark for the reporting base year.
86
  If the airlines fail to report this data,  they 
receive no allowances and any allowances for carbon dioxide emissions discharged during flights 
over Europe must be purchased at auction.
87
  Furthermore, if the airlines flying into the EU fail 
to submit their data within the prescribed time, they will face a penalty imposed by their 
administering member country.
88
  Take the following civil penalties imposed by the United 
Kingdom for example: Aircraft operators who failed to submit emissions monitoring plans by 
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 January 1, 2012, were punished with a minimum civil fine of 1,500 British pounds (GBP) 
(equivalent to over 2,200 USD).
89
  Furthermore, the United Kingdom charged an additional 150 
GBP penalty for each day of delay for up to ninety days, followed by an initiation of civil 
collection proceedings.
90
  Therefore, non-compliance with the EU ETS causes airlines to 
encounter unbearably large penalties,
 
which are passed on to passengers or airway freight 
clients.
91
  
 
4 THE ILLEGALITY OF EU COLLECTION OF AVIATION EMISSION TAXES TO BE 
LEVIED ON AIRLINES OUTSIDE THE EU’S JURISDICTION  
 
4.1 COLLECTION OF AVIATION CARBON EMISSION TAXES IS A VIOLATION OF 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF OTHER COUNTRIES  
 
The EU ETS has unilaterally included the carbon emissions of airlines from various 
countries that enter into, or depart from the EU into its carbon emissions calculation system 
without receiving either consent or authorization from the ICAO.
92
  Therefore, the EU ETS 
violates the jurisdiction of other countries regarding their aviation greenhouse gas emissions 
within their own borders.  It also violates the joint administrative rights of those countries over 
their public domain and airspace.
93
  However, the EU believes its legislation has committed no 
such violations,
94
 as it concluded that it did not interfere with the airspace of other countries 
when developing the aviation emissions legislation, and the airspace of other countries will 
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 continue to be recognized by the EU.
95
  The international community generally believes that the 
collection of aviation carbon emission taxes involving the airspace of other countries should be 
carried out on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
96
  As Prashant Sukul, the Joint Secretary of the 
India Ministry of Civil Aviation, pointed out, “market-based measures, such as charging [for] 
emissions on routes to/from India [and Europe], should be discussed and agreed upon on a 
bilateral basis and included in bilateral agreements.” 97   The ICAO explained that the EU’s 
decision to unilaterally enact legislation to include the aviation industry in the EU emission 
rights trading mechanism disregarded the concerns of non-EU countries, and violated Article 1 
of the Chicago Convention with respect to the principle of national sovereignty.
98
  
The authors believe that, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty, a state has 
jurisdiction over its territory, people, things, and events within its borders.  Therefore, no country 
may violate the sovereignty of another country while exercising its own sovereignty.  Here, the 
EU ETS has included the airlines of several non-EU countries.  Regarding airspace, an entire 
flight from one country to airports in certain EU member countries—which could cover 
thousands of kilometers—is subject to carbon emission calculations.  In reality, the air route 
involving EU airspace is only a small section of the journey, which undoubtedly infringes upon 
the sovereignty of other countries.  According to a calculation performed by ATAA, a flight from 
San Francisco to London would discharge 29% of its emissions over United States airspace, 37% 
over Canadian airspace, 25% over the high seas, and only 9% over EU airspace.99   
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 See Lauren E. Mullen, The European Union Overstepping Its Bounds and Borders: The Extraterritorial Effect of 
 This information shows that the EU has made an excessive regulatory expansion by 
upholding its aviation ETS.  The EU’s unilateral inclusion of the full range aircraft emissions 
from flights flying to, and leaving from the EU in its trading system results in de facto 
jurisdiction being exercised over pollutant emissions of aircraft flying over other countries’ 
airspace.  By creating legislation that implicates the interests of other countries, the EU is 
violating the notion of the sovereignty of other countries.  
4.2 THE EU ETS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF THE CHICAGO 
CONVENTION ON AVOIDANCE OF UNILATERAL IMPOSITION OF 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION CHARGES  
As noted previously, under the EU ETS, participants must purchase quotas at auction or 
through the carbon trading market.  These purchases are equivalent to a disguised form of 
collecting charges and taxes.
100
  In Article 15 of the Chicago Convention and the two guiding 
policy documents promulgated by the ICAO,
101
 there are provisions on avoiding unilateral 
implementation of greenhouse gas emission charges.  The resolutions of the ICAO General 
Assembly also explain that the only way an ETS should be implemented is on the basis of 
mutual consent between the implicated countries.
102
  In response, the EU stated that its act is 
only of an administrative nature and constitutes no charges whatsoever.
103
  The EU also argued 
that it  has accorded a sufficient right of refusal to the parties concerned, namely that they can 
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 choose to limit emissions within the scope of their free allowances.
104
  However, countries can 
also choose to be charged for emissions in excess of the scope of allowances.
105
  Furthermore, 
although the EU countries have acceded to the Chicago Convention, the EU, as a whole, is not a 
signatory and is therefore not bound by it.
106
  The EU pointed out that if other ICAO emission 
reduction programs are ultimately adopted, then the EU would be willing to modify its own 
emission reduction programs.
107
   
The authors are of the view that the right to choose to either purchase quotas at auction or 
through the carbon trading market is built on the basis of an unfair design.  This is because 
countries with emerging economies developing at a later stage will inevitably be subject to unfair 
treatment under such arrangements.
108
  According to the EU ETS, carbon emissions from 2004 to 
2006 will be used as an upper limit in 2012, and any emission beyond this limit must be offset by 
purchasing allowances.
109
  Although developing countries have relatively few existing air routes, 
their flight frequency is expected to increase.
110
  Consequently, the proportion of emission 
allowances available for purchase is likely to gradually increase.  Due to the relatively small 
scale of historical emissions of developing countries, only a small amount of free allowances are 
                                                             
104
 See Plant, supra note 100, at 184. 
105
 See Hale & Carrington, supra note 103. 
106
 LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 24.  
107 Hearing on the European Union’s Emissions Trading System Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 112th Cong. (2012) (written testimony of Jos Delbeke, Director-General, DG Climate Action, Eur. 
Comm’n), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=c0d84739-9b7b-4bac-
af43-fd02658ad3c9. 
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Latin Am. & Caribbean Air Trans. Ass’n, supra note 41 (“With the EU-ETS, Latin 
American and Caribbean airlines will need to pay significantly higher fees to conduct the same number of flights as 
the European airlines currently operate.”). 
109
 See id. at 12; Wei Wei, Aviation Carbon Tax Dispute in the Final Game, CHINA SEC. NEWSPAPER (June 13, 
2012), http://www.cs.com.cn/xwzx/hg/201206/t20120613_3369703.html.  
110
 See, e.g., AIRBUS, NAVIGATING THE FUTURE: GLOBAL MARKET FORECAST 2012-2031, at 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.airbus.com/company/market/forecast/?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=25773 (“An Airbus survey 
conducted recently[] showed that of the 10,000 people questioned worldwide, the majority believed that [they] 
would fly more in the future. In China and India[,] this number totaled more than 80% of respondents. . . .  As well 
as more flyers, we forecast a continuing expansion of the [w]orld’s aviation network, with greater aviation 
connectivity and more capacity between major population centers helping to drive benefits in terms of jobs, 
prosperity, and economic growth.”). 
 available, which will not fit the increasing scale of the aviation industries.
111
  In other words, 
because some countries are developing their own aviation industries, their greenhouse gas 
emissions will increase and require larger purchases of emission allowances. 
Regarding whether the EU is a signatory to the Chicago Convention and bound to the 
clauses thereof, the authors believe that the EU member countries have acceded to and 
acknowledged the Convention through a variety of ways, despite the fact that the Chicago 
Convention was executed before the establishment of the EU.  Although the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) stated that the ATAA could not use the Chicago Convention to challenge the 
validity of the Directive,112 its decision was controversial.  For example, Glen Plant, a barrister 
writing for the American Journal of International Law, stated that the ECJ “failed to examine 
customary norms[,] applying special jurisdictional rules to visits to a foreign country of civil 
aircraft (and, by way of carefully drawn analogy, ships), where concurrent criminal and quasi-
criminal jurisdiction exists in principle in both the territorial state and the state of registry (or 
flag).”113  The EU considers itself eligible to act on behalf of its member countries and holds 
bilateral air services agreement negotiations with other countries, but it also denies that its 
member countries are eligible to do so.114   However, the bilateral air services agreement is 
subject to the Chicago Convention’s constraints.115  Thus, if the EU exercises such power, then it 
would be acting contrary to its obligations under the Chicago Convention.116  
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 4.3 THE EU ETS IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF “COMMON BUT 
DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES"  
The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities"117  (CBDR) is the basic 
principle adopted by the Kyoto Protocol.118  On May 15, 2012, the EU issued warnings to ten 
Chinese and Indian airlines for failing to submit their previous carbon emissions by the deadline, 
later determining that these failures were sanctionable offenses that warranted punishment.119  
The EU included developing countries like China into its aviation ETS without first obtaining its 
consent.  Such actions clearly violate the principle of CBDR, established by the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.120  Furthermore, this action violates the provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol which state that developing countries do not have emission reduction obligations.121  In 
order to promote the emission reduction objectives of developed countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
also provides for the use of three emission reduction mechanisms: joint implementation, 
emissions trading, and the CDM.122  Emission trading is the practice where countries that have 
exceeded their emissions quotas purchase allowances from other countries that have not.  As a 
result, the total emissions are still maintained or capped within the set limit.123  Therefore, the 
EU ETS has not treated developed and developing countries equally. 
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 4.4 INAPPROPRIATENESS OF PROCEDURES  
According to Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, parties shall seek to reduce carbon 
emissions through the appropriate international institution: the ICAO.
 124
  While the EU 
acknowledges this, it has not confined itself to the ICAO framework when addressing carbon 
emissions.  In accordance with the provisions on the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, no provisions stating "through the [ICAO]" can be interpreted as "not 
through the [ICAO]."
125
  Neither systematic nor literal interpretation methods are able to justify 
the viewpoints held by the EU.  The EU still lacks a legal basis for bypassing the ICAO and 
unilaterally addressing an obviously multilateral problem. 
In 2009, the ATAA and related airlines took legal action in Britain's High Court, 
demanding that the EU revoke its aviation ETS.
126
  Britain's High Court asked the ECJ to 
provide guidance on the matter.
127
  In 2011, the ECJ ruled against the ATAA,
128
 while the 
CAAC prohibited airlines within the territory of China from participating in the EU ETS.
129
  
5 WAYS AND MEANS TO ADDRESS DISPUTES CONCERNING THE EU AVIATION 
ETS 
Several countries and organizations have criticized the EU ETS, and have taken 
appropriate countermeasures in a widespread manner.  For example, the ICAO Council failed to 
address the EU ETS in its Annual Report, seemingly denying its legitimacy.130  Furthermore, the 
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 U.S. airline industry challenged the EU aviation ETS in the United Kingdom,131 and the U.S. 
Congress passed a bill prohibiting U.S. airlines from complying with it.132   In addition, on 
February 6, 2012, China's State Council authorized the CAAC to make a public announcement 
prohibiting Chinese airlines from participating in the EU ETS.133  The China Air Transport 
Association (CATA) made a similar announcement, declaring that it will never participate in the 
EU ETS.134   
The tug-of-war with carbon taxes lasted for nearly a year before hitting a turning point in 
November 2012, when the European Commission decided to suspend the collection of carbon 
emission taxes against flights in and out of Europe.135  The ICAO General Assembly noted that 
any attempt to design the new implementation or existing market-based measure (MBM) must be 
agreed upon by the other members, indirectly rejecting the EU’s unilateral carbon tax plan by the 
MBM agreement.136  This is the new result of efforts by the international community to protest 
the EU ETS.  However, the EU approved a new amendment for its Directive.  Peter Liese, 
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 rapporteur of the European Parliament's Committee on the Environment (ENVI), insisted that the 
Commission “should act after the next ICAO assembly, in 2016, because there's absolutely no 
guarantee that the ICAO will have resolved the problem."137  The ENVI voted on the proposal on 
January 30, 2014.138   
5.1 FORMING A COALITION TO BOYCOTT THE EU AVIATION DIRECTIVE  
In February of 2012, delegates from twenty-three countries, including China, the U.S., 
Russia, and India, drafted and adopted the Moscow Declaration, unanimously opposing the 
inclusion of aviation emissions into the ETS, and introducing a package of alternative 
measures. 139   The Moscow Declaration encourages signatory countries to employ specific 
countermeasures, including prohibiting domestic airlines from participating in the ETS, 
modifying the Open Skies Agreements with EU countries, and suspending or modifying 
negotiations on expanding the rights of commercial flights. 140   The execution and effective 
implementation of the Moscow Declaration indicates that jointly responding to the EU Directive 
through an international coalition was an effective technique.  In August 2012, the U.S. State 
Department and Department of Transportation hosted a meeting with delegates of seventeen 
other non-European countries in Washington, D.C. to further discuss opposition to the EU 
ETS.141   
Since countries with developed aviation industries outside of the EU received no 
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 exemption through the process of litigation and negotiations with the EU, their resistance took 
the form of boycotts.  Developing countries like China and India also took similar measures, 
asking their own domestic airlines to participate in a boycott of the EU ETS.142  Similarly, the 
CATA and several Chinese airlines issued a joint statement denouncing the requirements of the 
EU ETS.143  
5.2 TECHNICAL MEASURES RELATED TO CARBON EMISSIONS ON AIR ROUTES  
The allocation of EU ETS allowances from 2012 to 2020 is based on the revenue ton 
kilometer (RTK) for the monitoring year, 2010.144  China has prohibited its domestic airlines 
from participating in the EU ETS; consequently, Chinese airlines should not take part in 
arrangements for obtaining higher portions of free allowances.  The authors believe that it is 
advisable to monitor the annual increase of flights; it is also important to note that under the EU 
aviation ETS, an increase in flights might not guarantee an increase of RTK.145  If the airlines of 
various countries should increase the number of flights in the monitoring year, the additional 
allowances they are eligible to receive will depend on the comparative growth of the RTK 
increases of other airlines.146  The EU ETS favors flights with stopovers in countries closer to 
EU members, potentially increasing the number of stopovers for EU-bound flights.147  This will 
actually cause aircraft to burn more fuel and generate more greenhouse gas emissions, resulting 
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 in increased transportation costs and decreased market competitiveness in the aviation 
industry.148  This practice is contrary to China’s stated intentions,149 as well as its commitment to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.150 
5.3 IMPROVING MARKET-ORIENTED RESPONSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH THE 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, it is possible to achieve energy conservation and emission 
reduction via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).151  As of 2012, China had registered 
for the highest number of CDM projects (1,858 total) and achieved the highest emission 
reduction (367,754,013 CO2e/year) out of all participating countries.
152  In accordance with the 
expanding scale of the Chinese airlines, the airline companies may be required to purchase 
carbon emission allowances from the carbon trading market.  Essentially, the aviation industry 
seeks “optimal interaction [with] the EU ETS” through alternative mechanisms in order to 
achieve a dynamic balance in market operational levels between the EU and China.153 
In formulating the development strategy of Chinese airlines, the authors suggest utilizing 
environmentally conscious energy projects in order to offset carbon emission.  For example, on 
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 October 28, 2011, Air China, Boeing, PetroChina, and Honeywell UOP cooperated jointly to 
launch the first ever Chinese test flight using sustainable aviation biofuels at Beijing Capital 
International Airport.154  Air China used a Boeing 747-400 airliner fueled by “jatropha,” a plant 
sourced in China, for a test flight that lasted two hours.155   This test flight represented an 
important step towards a more widespread commercial application of biofuels.  As an ideal 
candidate to replace high-polluting fossil fuels, biofuels have long attracted the attention of 
several countries like Brazil, the U.S., South Korea, Indonesia, and those of the EU.  These 
countries have all unveiled development strategies that support the popularization of biofuels in 
order to contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions.156  
6 CONCLUSION  
The EU ETS is a financial market-trading mechanism created by the EU under the guise 
of environmental protection, while being primarily focused on economics more than 
environmental concerns.  It is important for non-EU countries to voice their concerns regarding 
global carbon emission issues, which could stimulate the exportation of EU energy saving 
equipment.  The full implementation of the EU ETS would inflict tremendous economic loss on 
airlines operating EU routes, including those of China.  Furthermore, the implementation of the 
EU ETS violates relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the Chicago Convention, and other 
international legislation.  The U.S. attempted to litigate this issue, but did not have a favorable 
outcome in the ECJ.  Several affected countries formed a coalition under the Moscow 
Declaration and have united through the ICAO to jointly boycott the EU aviation ETS.  Because 
of this, the EU has now suspended the implementation of the aviation ETS.  Airlines of 
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 developing countries should participate in other environmental projects to reduce their carbon 
emissions. As Müller and Slominski stated, “from a problem-solving perspective, it may not 
suffice that the EU only manages to agree on an ETS through strategies whose main purpose is to 
shift immediate political costs into the future.”157   
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